Epistemic injustice is a concept within social epistemology that pertains to the injustice individuals experience in their role as knowers or epistemic agents. It was first introduced by philosopher Miranda Fricker in 2007.

Fricker identified two primary forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice:

Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences.

Fricker (2007, 1)

The following two comic strips will provide you with a quick understanding of these two forms of epistemic injustice.

Testimonial Injustice:

Character B dismisses Character A’s evidence without considering it, solely based on their biased perception of Character A’s age. This is an example of testimonial injustice where Character A’s credibility is unfairly diminished.

Hermeneutical Injustice:

Character A struggles to find the appropriate words or concepts to articulate her experience due to the absence of a shared framework or understanding. As a result, she encounters difficulties in effectively communicating her experience, leading to a lack of recognition and validation. This exemplifies hermeneutical injustice, where the absence of a shared language or conceptual framework constrains Character A’s capacity to fully express herself and contribute to the collective knowledge of the organization or community she belongs to.

An additional example of hermeneutical injustice is the concept of “microaggressions.” Before the term gained widespread recognition and understanding, individuals who experienced subtle forms of discrimination or biased interactions lacked a specific category to describe their experiences. Consequently, understanding and effectively communicating their encounters with microaggressions were unfairly challenging. This created difficulties in addressing and raising awareness about the issue, impeding efforts to tackle systemic biases and promote inclusivity.

To generalize, testimonial injustice occurs when someone’s credibility or trustworthiness as a knower is unfairly diminished or disregarded based on attributes like their gender, race, age, or social status. It involves biased assumptions or stereotypes that lead to their testimony being given less importance or completely ignored, resulting in a loss of epistemic power. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when individuals or communities face challenges in comprehending or articulating their experiences fully due to a lack of shared language that enables them to make sense of their unique perspectives. This situation arises when there is a gap in existing knowledge frameworks or cultural understandings, impeding individuals from effectively expressing their experiences, engaging in meaningful dialogue, and participating in knowledge-sharing practices.

Both forms of epistemic injustice can have significant social, ethical, and practical implications, impacting individuals’ ability to participate fully in public discourse, obtain justice, and have their perspectives and experiences acknowledged and valued.

According to Byskov (2021), unfair communicative structures, institutions, and practices contribute to the emergence of epistemic injustice, exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequalities and injustices. Therefore, recognizing and addressing this issue has become increasingly crucial.

Addressing Epistemic Injustice in Business and Finance

Academic research has aimed to identify and address epistemic injustice in the business world. For instance, Kwok (2021) argues that workplace hierarchies influence both forms of epistemic injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when lower-ranked workers are unfairly perceived as less credible, including when they raise complaints about workplace injustices. Conversely, higher-ranked managers often benefit from an unjustified credibility advantage solely based on their positions within the hierarchy. Hermeneutical injustice arises when lower-ranked workers lack the necessary collective platforms to contribute their knowledge, engage in “collective sense-making” (p. 1116), and challenge intentional ignorance.

Smith and Archer (2020) examines epistemic injustice within the context of the attention economy, arguing that not giving individuals the attention they deserve, termed an “epistemic attention deficit,” represents a distinct form of epistemic injustice. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing individuals as epistemic agents, both in terms of their potential as sources of testimony and their possession of valuable epistemic capacities that can be “acknowledged, developed, and celebrated” (p. 780), and that failure to afford individuals the attention they deserve in their capacity as epistemic agents can adversely impact their ability to engage in meaningful epistemic practices.

For instance, in the competition for limited user attention, businesses owned by individuals with greater resources or employing more aggressive marketing strategies may receive an excessive amount of attention disproportionate to their actual value or quality, creating an attention excess. In contrast, other entrepreneurs or business owners offering equally valuable products or services but lacking resources will experience an attention deficit as they struggle to capture attention in the crowded marketplace. Consequently, deserving companies may remain unnoticed or underappreciated, resulting in an inequitable distribution of attention and potential economic disadvantages.

de Bruin (2021) explores the concept of epistemic injustice within the realm of consumer and small business loans, focusing on the phenomenon of self-fulfilling testimonial injustice. Specifically, it delves into the intricate nature of this particular form of testimonial injustice, wherein individuals from marginalized groups internalize negative stereotypes about their financial capabilities and skills. Consequently, their epistemic self-confidence diminishes, leading to suboptimal search behavior and product selection, thereby reinforcing the negative stereotypes and perpetuating further instances of epistemic injustice.

While academic studies on the remedies of epistemic injustice often have a broader scope beyond the business and finance context, their principles can be readily applied to these domains. A notable example is Fricker’s remedy for testimonial injustice, known as testimonial justice (TJ). TJ entails recognizing and correcting biases rooted in a person’s identity through practices such as self-awareness and reflection. While familiar prejudices can be reduced through habituation, addressing unfamiliar prejudices necessitates ongoing critical reflection (Fricker, 2007, p. 98).

Carmona (2022) proposes engaging epistemically with others (EE) as a remedy for epistemic injustice, distinguishing it from TJ by emphasizing proactive training in effective conversational engagement. EE, as conceptualized by the author, refers to actively engaging with one’s epistemic counterpart in a testimonial exchange in a manner that is epistemically relevant to that specific instance of communication. While EE primarily addresses testimonial injustice, it also holds the potential to alleviate hermeneutical injustice by promoting awareness of the unique challenges and hermeneutical devices of fellow epistemic agents. The paper emphasizes the significance of raising awareness about the presence of injustice in our testimonial exchanges, developing knowledge of identified forms of epistemic injustice and specific cases, and fostering an understanding of related concepts as essential components of civic learning.

Tian and Nutbrown (2023) proposes three strategies for integrating epistemic justice and reciprocity into distributed leadership: building trust and self-trust, redistributing epistemic resources, and reconfiguring relational justice. To build trust and self-trust, we need to be mindful of the relative expertise of others on the topic at hand and be willing to adjust our trust accordingly. Redistributing epistemic resources involves creating an environment where individuals feel comfortable expressing and sharing their evolving insights. Reconfiguring relational justice involves providing protection against unjust treatment, opening communication channels, and reconfiguring the traditional knower versus non-knower relationship.

Smith and Archer (2020) addresses the issue of tackling epistemic attention deficits within the context of the attention economy. The paper suggests that addressing these deficits necessitates a collective endeavor to modify the existing patterns of epistemic attention. It highlights the significant role that cultural producers, such as artists, novelists, poets, filmmakers, and musicians, can play in reshaping our patterns of attention.

To gain a deeper understanding of epistemic injustice and its remedies, we suggest readers explore the full texts of the aforementioned papers.

In conclusion, it is clear that understanding and addressing epistemic injustice is an ongoing endeavor. The concept of epistemic injustice continues to evolve, and new forms of it are being identified as our understanding deepens. It is crucial for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to remain vigilant and responsive to these emerging forms of injustice, as they have the potential to perpetuate inequality and hinder progress. By actively acknowledging, challenging, and rectifying the diverse manifestations of epistemic injustice, we can foster a business and financial landscape that embraces equity, inclusivity, and a genuine appreciation for knowledge, thereby upholding justice in our collective pursuit.

References:

Byskov, M.F. (2021), What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”? J Soc Philos, 52: 114-131.  https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12348

Carmona, C. (2022). Engaging Epistemically with the Other: Toward a More Dialogical and Plural Understanding of the Remedy for Testimonial Injustice. Episteme, 1-30. doi:10.1017/epi.2022.48

de Bruin, B. (2021). Epistemic Injustice in Finance. Topoi 40, 755–763. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09677-y

Fricker M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kwok, C. (2021). Epistemic injustice in workplace hierarchies: Power, knowledge and status. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 47(9), 1104–1131. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453720961523

Smith, L., Archer, A. (2020). Epistemic Injustice and the Attention Economy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23, 777–795. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10123-x

Tian, M., & Nutbrown, G. (2023). Retheorising distributed leadership through epistemic injustice. Educational Management Administration & Leadership, 51(4), 774–790. https://doi.org/10.1177/17411432211022776

Like (0)